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Introduction
At the beginning of June, the Treasury Department
issued proposed regulations providing guidance regarding the portion of a trust that is included in the grantor’s
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes when, among
other circumstances, the grantor has retained the right to
annuity or unitrust payments that last for the grantor’s
life, a period not ascertainable without reference to the
grantor’s death or a period that does not, in fact, end
before the grantor’s death.
Primarily, those trusts are charitable remainder annuity trusts (CRATs) or unitrusts (CRUTs), described in
section 664(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as
amended, and grantor retained annuity trusts (GRATs) or
unitrusts (GRUTs), described in reg. section 25.2702-3.
The proposed regulations state that they also will apply
to qualified personal residence trusts (QPRTs), described
in reg. section 25.2702-5(c), and other forms of grantor
retained income trusts (GRITs).

Background
Section 2036(a)(1) provides that property transferred
during one’s lifetime in trust or otherwise, other than in
a bona fide sale for full and adequate consideration in
money or money’s worth, is included in the gross estate
of the transferor for federal estate tax purposes if the
transferor retained the right to the income from, or the
possession and enjoyment of, the property for life, for a
period not ascertainable without reference to the transferor’s death, or for a period that does not, in fact, end
before the transferor’s death.
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Section 2039 provides that a decedent’s gross estate
includes the value of an annuity or other payment under
any form of contract or agreement (other than a policy of
insurance on the decedent’s life) receivable by any beneficiary by reason of surviving the decedent if, under the
contract or agreement, an annuity or other payment was
payable to the decedent, or if the decedent (either alone
or in conjunction with another) possessed the right to
receive the annuity or other payment, for life, for a period
not ascertainable without reference to the decedent’s
death or for a period that does not, in fact, end before the
decedent’s death.
In some cases in which an individual transfers property to another person and retains an interest in that
property, the transferor will not retain the right to income
from (or possession and enjoyment of) the property but
will instead retain the right to a unitrust payment (a fixed
percentage, such as 5 percent or 10 percent, of the annual
value of the property) or an annuity (a fixed sum of
money). For example, if a transferor creates a charitable
remainder trust described in section 664, to qualify the
trust for treatment under that section (which will allow
the transferor an income tax deduction for the value of
the remainder committed to charity and which will
confer tax-exempt status on the trust), the transferor may
retain only an annuity or unitrust interest (or the lesser of
trust income or the unitrust amount) within the parameters described in that section. Similarly, under section
2702, an individual who wishes to transfer a remainder
interest in property to a family member and be treated as
making a gift only of the actuarial value of the remainder
(and not the value of the entire underlying property)
must either transfer a personal residence and meet some
other requirements as described in reg. section 25.27025(b) or retain only the right to unitrust or annuity
payments as described in reg. section 25.2702-3.

Prior Rules on Inclusion of CRAT or CRUT
In Rev. Rul. 76-273, 1976-2 C.B. 268, and Rev. Rul.
82-105, 1982-1 C.B. 133, the IRS set forth its views
regarding the part of a CRUT or CRAT, respectively, that
would be included under section 2036 in the gross estate
of a decedent who created such a trust and retained the
right to unitrust or annuity payments for life (or for a
period not ascertainable without reference to the decedent’s death or for a period that, in fact, did not end
before the decedent’s death). It is worth noting that Rev.
Rul. 82-105 did not rule out the potential applicability of
section 2039 to CRUTs or CRATs. Essentially, those two
revenue rulings calculated the percentage interest in the
trust that the unitrust or annuity represented based on
the proportion of the trust necessary to produce an
income interest of an equal amount at prevailing interest
rates under the applicable tables. For example, if the
annuity payable at the grantor’s death is $40,000 a year
and the trust is then worth $1 million, the $40,000 annuity
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Prior Guidance on Inclusion of GRAT or GRUT
Although it is likely not advisable from an estate and
gift tax planning perspective for a property owner to
create a GRUT as opposed to a GRAT, it is possible a
taxpayer might do so.1 The IRS, before the issuance of
these proposed regulations, had expressed unofficial
views about the inclusion of a retained annuity or
unitrust interest in the grantor’s estate with respect to
GRATs and GRUTs. See, e.g., FSA 200036012, Doc 200023372, 2000 TNT 176-61; LTRs2 9451056, 94 TNT 252-86;
9345035, 93 TNT 233-65; and 9412036,3 94 TNT 59-48, in
which the IRS stated that a GRAT or GRUT is included in
full in the gross estate of a grantor who dies during the
annuity or unitrust term under both sections 2036(a)(1)
and 2039.
What the Proposed Regs Provide
The proposed regulations set forth two general rules
regarding the estate tax inclusion of retained interests.
First, they amend reg. section 20.2036-1 essentially to
apply the principles set forth in Rev. Rul. 76-273 and Rev.
Rul. 82-105 to CRATs, CRUTs, GRATs, and GRUTs. In
general, they adopt the same treatment for both charitable remainder trusts and grantor retained interest
trusts. Second, the proposed regulations amend reg.
section 20.2039-1 to provide that section 2039 will not
apply to a CRAT, CRUT, GRAT, or GRUT. That is a
welcome clarification of the scope of section 2039, which
appears to eliminate the previously overlapping treatment of some grantor retained interests under both
sections 2036 and 2039.
The scope and impact of the proposed regulations are
described in several examples that, as described below,
set forth general principles but do not provide sufficient
detail to cover all types of retained interests commonly
used in estate planning. The example in prop. reg. section
20.2036-1(c)(1)4 deals with a decedent who created an
irrevocable trust during his lifetime to pay half of the

1

See Blattmachr, Slade, and Zeydel, Partial Interests — GRATs,
GRUTs, QPRTs (section 2702), BNA Tax Management Portfolio
836-2d at A-53 (hereinafter Portfolio 836-2d).
2
Under section 6110(k)(3), neither a private letter ruling nor
a national office technical advice memorandum may be cited or
used as precedent.
3
LTR 9412036 involved a joint purchase of interests in a
GRUT.
4
The proposed regulations would ‘‘renumber’’ reg. section
20.2036-1 by, for example, designating the last paragraph of
what is now reg. section 20.2036-1(a) as new reg. section
20.2036-1(c) and adding a heading to it.

income to the grantor and half to the grantor’s spouse5
while they are both living, and all of the income to the
survivor of the spouses for the balance of his or her
lifetime. The example concludes that the entire trust is
included in the grantor’s estate if the grantor is survived
by his or her spouse. Presumably, it reaches that conclusion because, on the grantor’s death, the grantor would
be entitled to receive all the income, triggering full estate
tax inclusion of the trust under section 2036(a)(1). The
example concludes that only one-half of the trust would
be included in the grantor’s estate if the grantor were the
first spouse to die. Presumably, that conclusion is based
on the fact that at the grantor’s death in that case, the
grantor would be entitled to one-half of the income.
Indeed, that conclusion seems to be supported by the
second sentence in the last paragraph of reg. section
20.2036-1(a).6
But a more complete analysis suggests the second
conclusion of this example may not be correct. The
long-standing regulations under section 2036(a)(1) provide that even if the grantor is not entitled to income at
the time of death but would succeed to the income if he
had survived the current income beneficiary, the amount
included in the grantor’s gross estate is the value of the
entire trust reduced by the actuarial value of the income
interest held by the current income beneficiary. See reg.
section 20.2036-1(a) (first sentence of last paragraph).7
Hence, even when the grantor is the first spouse to die,

5
The example recites that the grantor’s spouse is a U.S.
citizen. The citizenship of the grantor’s spouse seems irrelevant
to the conclusion reached or purpose of the example. Presumably, it is part of the example because a gift to a spouse cannot
qualify for the gift tax marital deduction. See section 2523(i). The
example should add words to the effect that:
The estate tax result would be the same even if the
grantor’s spouse were not a U.S. citizen, but any gift
made by the grantor upon creation of the trust would not
qualify for the gift tax marital deduction under section
2523(a), on account of section 2523(i), and the portion of
the trust included in the grantor’s estate would not
qualify for the estate tax marital deduction under section
2056(a), even if the spouse survives and the income
interest continues for life of the grantor’s spouse, unless
the trust is in the form of a qualified domestic trust
described in section 2056A.
Perhaps, the statement that the spouse is a U.S. citizen is
intended to suggest that the half interest devoted to the spouse
constituted ‘‘qualified terminable interest property’’ under section 2523(f).
6
The sentence reads: ‘‘If the decedent retained or reserved an
interest or right with respect to a part only of the property
transferred by him, the amount to be included in his gross estate
under section 2036 is only a corresponding proportion of the
amount described in the preceding sentence.’’
7
The sentence reads:
If the decedent retained or reserved an interest or right
with respect to all of the property transferred by him, the
amount to be included in his gross estate under section
2036 is the value of the entire property, less only the value
of any outstanding income interest which is not subject to
the decedent’s interest or right and which is actually
being enjoyed by another person at the time of the
decedent’s death.

(Footnote continued on next page.)
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represents a 4 percent payout of the trust corpus. An
income interest would produce a 6 percent annual payment at prevailing interest rates, and two-thirds (that is,
4 percent/6 percent) of the value of the trust at the
grantor’s death (that is, $666,667) would be included in
the grantor’s gross estate. Those revenue rulings were
issued before enactment of section 7520, which now
provides for each month the percentage return that an
income interest represents (for example, 5.6 percent for
June 2007 and 6 percent for July 2007).
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As indicated above, the proposed regulations would make
the paragraph in which the sentence is contained a new
paragraph (c)(1).
8
An exception to the estate tax inclusion of the income
interest of the spouse under section 2036 would arise if the
portion of the trust in which the spouse had the income for life
qualified as and was elected for qualified terminable interest
property treatment under section 2523(f). See reg. section
25.2523(f)-1(f), examples 10 and 11.
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of the valuation date is 6 percent) but it also shows a
calculation of the charitable estate tax deduction. The
example, as indicated, assumes a 6 percent section 7520
rate in effect on the date of the decedent’s death, but it
does not mention what the 7520 rate was for either of the
prior months, even though the rate for either prior month
may be used under section 7520(a) (last sentence) in
valuing a retained interest in a split-interest trust, such as
a charitable remainder trust. It would be helpful if the
example dealt with the ability to select the section 7520
rate for valuation of the retained interest and also dealt
with a situation in which alternate valuation was elected
under section 2032 (although Example 3, discussed below, dealing with a charitable remainder unitrust, mentions but does not describe the method of inclusion for
the use of the alternate valuation date). As described
above, Example 1 expressly states that the IRS will not
seek to apply, and that the taxpayer cannot seek to apply,
section 2039 to determine the portion of the trust included in the grantor’s gross estate. That prohibition is
presumably intended to prevent a taxpayer from seeking
100 percent inclusion under section 2039 to obtain a full
step-up in basis of the entire trust estate under section
1014 when that would be tax advantageous (for example,
if full estate tax inclusion of the trust were offset by
increases in the applicable credit amount under section
2010).
Example 2 involves a GRAT in which the grantor
retains the right to receive $12,000 per year until the
earlier of the expiration of 10 years or the grantor’s death
before the end of the 10-year term. The example calculates the amount of the trust (worth $300,000 at the
grantor’s death) included in the grantor’s gross estate,
taking into account the adjustment necessary to account
for the fact that the annuity is paid monthly.9 It expressly
states that the grantor’s executor did not elect alternate
valuation, implying that the result could be different if
alternate valuation were elected. Adding an illustration
when the alternate valuation election is made would be
helpful and would clarify not only whether just the
alternate valuation value of the trust would be used to
determine the portion included but also whether the
section 7520 rate in effect on the alternate valuation date
also should be used.10 Indeed, it would be helpful to
illustrate the impact of a change in the section 7520 rate
when the alternate valuation date used to value the

9

The example states, in part: ‘‘No additional contributions
were made to the trust after [the grantor’s] transfer at the
creation of the trust.’’ The reason for that statement is uncertain,
and the statement is misleading. First, it does not seem that the
amount included under section 2036(a)(1) is dependent on the
timing of contributions. Second, the example states, in effect,
that the GRAT is one described in ‘‘section 2702(b),’’ which by
definition must prohibit additional contributions. Reg. section
25.2702-3(b)(5). Although it is probably superfluous, the statement quoted above could be read to suggest that a GRAT
described in section 2702(b) could permit additional contributions.
10
The preamble to the proposed regulations suggests the
section 7520 rate in effect on the alternate valuation date should
be used.
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the value of the entire trust is included in the grantor’s
estate reduced only by the actuarial value of the income
interest held by the grantor’s spouse at the time the
grantor dies.8 The value of the spouse’s remaining income interest will be determined, presumably, under the
principles of reg. section 20.2031-7. Unlike some lifetime
transfers, the value of the spouse’s income interest in this
example will not be treated as having no value, as an
income interest may be for gift tax purposes under
section 2702. However, if the spouse’s death is imminent,
the actuarial value of the spouse’s income interest may be
very close to zero. See reg. section 25.7520-3(b)(3).
For example, a decedent who created a trust of the
type described in the example dies when her husband is
72 years old, the section 7520 rate is 6 percent, and the
value of the trust is $1 million (and alternate valuation is
not elected under section 2032). The decedent’s husband’s death is not imminent. Half of the trust is included in the decedent’s gross estate by reason of the
decedent’s unexpired income interest in half of the trust.
But what about the other half of the trust for which the
decedent has a succeeding income interest, following the
husband’s remaining income interest? The value of the
husband’s income interest in half of the trust is 47.971
percent x $500,000, or $239,855. Hence, $760,145
($1,000,000 - $239,855) of the trust should be included in
the decedent’s gross estate for federal estate tax purposes
under section 2036(a)(1). Nonetheless, as suggested, the
proposed regulations would require an inclusion of only
$500,000. That would be the case only if half the trust
qualified for QTIP under section 2523(f).
New paragraph (c)(2) under reg. section 20.2036-1 is
entitled ‘‘Retained Annuity and Unitrust Interests in
Trusts,’’ but its text applies not only to those retained
interests but also to ‘‘other income interests in any trust
(other than a trust constituting an employee benefit).’’ It
provides the basic rule that ‘‘the portion of the trust’s
corpus includible in the decedent’s gross estate . . . is the
portion of the trust corpus necessary to yield the decedent’s retained use [apparently referring to examples
such as the right to use the personal residence in a
qualified personal residence trust, which is mentioned in
the paragraph] or retained annuity, unitrust, or other
income payment.’’ The paragraph contains several examples.
Example 1 deals with a taxpayer who creates a CRAT
paying an annuity for life that is to continue for the
taxpayer’s child who survives the grantor. The example
not only illustrates the portion of the trust included in the
gross estate (which is two-thirds, or $200,000, of the
$300,000 trust, in which the annuity of $12,000 represents
a 4 percent yield and the section 7520 rate then in effect as
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ments. An illustration should be added to the proposed
regulations to address such increasing (and, perhaps,
decreasing) annuity payment GRATs.
Another issue, as indicated above, seems to arise for
GRATs (or GRUTs) that provide for the payments to be
made for a fixed term to the grantor or, if the grantor dies
during the fixed term, to the grantor’s estate: How, if at
all, do future payments due the grantor’s estate affect the
part of the trust included in the grantor’s estate? The
proposed regulations, as indicated before, do not deal
with such a GRAT or GRUT. It may be that the current
value of the future payments due the grantor’s estate is
included in the grantor’s estate under section 2033.11
Obviously, it would be inappropriate to impose double
taxation through a combined application of sections 2033
and 2036.12 The final regulations therefore should address whether, and to what degree, payments due the
grantor’s estate following the grantor’s death from a
GRAT or GRUT will affect the portion of the trust
included in the grantor’s gross estate.
Another question is whether section 2036(a)(1) applies
at all in a situation in which the value of the annuity
stream retained in a GRAT is equal to (or greater than)
the value of the property transferred to the GRAT by the
grantor. As an actuarial matter, the grantor may retain an
annuity stream for a fixed term (payable to the grantor,
or, if the grantor dies during that term, to the grantor’s
estate) and make the current value of the annuity stream
equal to the value of the property transferred to the
GRAT. (Cf. reg. section 25.2702-3(e), Example 5, for an
illustration in which the grantor retains a unitrust stream
for a term of years for herself or, if she dies during the
term, for her estate.) For example, if the section 7520 rate
is 6 percent and the grantor retains for herself (or, if she
dies, for her estate) the right to an annuity payable at the
first anniversary of the transfer to the trust equal to 51
percent of the gift tax value of the property transferred
and the right to an annuity payable at the second
anniversary of the transfer to the trust equal to 59 percent
of the gift tax value of the property transferred, the value
of the annuity stream would equal the value of the
property transferred to the trust. It would seem more

11

Cf. Portfolio 836-2d at A-46 (stating that the actuarial value
of the balance of the annuity payments or unitrust payments
payable to the grantor’s estate is included in the grantor’s gross
estate, as would a reversion).
12
Cf. Rev. Rul. 84-25, 1984-1 C.B. 191 (indicating that, to
provide double taxation, it would be inappropriate to include
the same item in the gross estate under section 2033 and in
adjusted taxable gifts); see also Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-246, 84 TCM 374, Doc 2002-22023, 2002
TNT 188-7, aff’d, 382 F.3d 367, Doc 2004-17577, 2004 TNT 171-8
(3d Cir. 2004); Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2002-121, 83 TCM 1641, Doc 2002-11394, 2002 TNT 95-11 (indicating that, when a family limited partnership is disregarded
under section 2036, the limited partnership units must otherwise be disregarded for estate tax purposes). One well respected
commentator has suggested that in that case only the proportion
of the annuity payable from the nonincluded portion of the
GRAT should be included under section 2033. See C. McCaffrey,
‘‘Planning With GRATs,’’ Trusts & Estates Wealth Management
Conference at p. 21 (Oct. 20, 2003).
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underlying assets of the trust is different (for example,
because one or more assets of the trust are sold within six
months of the decedent’s death). Also, if the section 7520
rate in effect on the alternate valuation date should be
used, the regulations should clarify that use of the
alternate valuation date is permitted as long as the gross
estate and estate tax decrease, as required by section
2032(c), even if the value of the trust estate has increased.
For example, if the trust is worth $1 million on the date of
the decedent’s death, the annuity is $40,000, and the
section 7520 rate is 6 percent, two-thirds of the trust estate
would be included ($666,667). If, on the alternate valuation date, the trust has increased in value to $1.2 million
but the section 7520 rate has increased to 7 percent, less
than half of the trust estate would be included. That
would mean that the value of the gross estate and the
estate tax due would decline, even though the value of
the trust has increased, and the election to use the
alternate valuation date should be available.
Although Example 2 is helpful in determining the
portion of a GRAT included when the annuity is the same
each year and when the grantor’s entitlement to payments end on the grantor’s death, it does not provide
assistance in determining the portion included in the
gross estate when the annuity varies from year to year or
the annuity payments will continue to be paid, if the
grantor dies during any fixed term, to the grantor’s
estate. As an actuarial matter, the grantor may retain an
annuity stream for a fixed term (payable to the grantor or,
if the grantor dies during that term, to the grantor’s
estate) and may even make the present value of the
annuity stream equal to the value of the property transferred to the GRAT (a so-called zeroed-out GRAT). (Cf.
reg. section 25.2702-3(e), Example 5, for an illustration in
which the grantor retains a unitrust stream for a term of
years for herself or, if she dies during the term, for her
estate.)
Indeed, the annuity payments from a GRAT described
in reg. section 25.2702-3(b)(1) need not be fixed, although,
for purposes of determining the value of a retained
annuity interest for gift tax purposes, only increases not
in excess of 20 percent per year are considered. Many
GRATs that qualify under section 2702(b) do provide for
the annuity payments to increase by 20 percent each year.
In cases in which section 2702 does not apply (for
example, a GRAT with remainder over to a niece or
nephew that is not subject to the provisions of section
2702), the annuity payments may increase by more than
20 percent each year. In any case, the amount of the
inclusion under section 2036 presumably will be based
on the maximum annuity amount the grantor might
ultimately be entitled to receive (with an appropriate
subtraction for the present value of any outstanding
interest at the time of the grantor’s death, such as an
unpaid annuity payment due the grantor that presumably would be included in the grantor’s gross estate
under section 2033). Another approach would be to
compute the actuarially equivalent fixed (nonincreasing)
annuity on the date of the grantor’s death and compute
the percentage of the trust includable based on an income
interest equivalent to the recalculated annuity. Unfortunately, as indicated, the proposed regulations do not deal
with such commonly used increasing annuity arrange-
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Cf. Ray v. United States, 762 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1985).
Cf. TAM 200245003, Doc 2002-24973, 2002 TNT 218-22,
indicating that the preamble to the section 2702 regulations
contemplates that a GRAT may not be zeroed out. See generally
Portfolio 836-2d at A-56 and A-88.
15
Compare Becklenberg Est. v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 297 (7th
Cir. 1959), with Ray, 762 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1985).
16
See, e.g., Michael D. Whitty, ‘‘Heresy or Prophecy: The Case
for Limiting Estate Tax Inclusion of GRATs to the Annuity
Payment Right,’’ 41 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 381 (2006) (suggesting that the bona fide sale exception might be a basis for
rejecting inclusion under section 2036 with respect to a zeroedout GRAT).
14
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the entire trust is included in the grantor’s estate if the
grantor dies during the term, the way in which the
example is drafted may mislead some taxpayers and
advisers into thinking that creating a GRIT for family
members is acceptable. Of course, the gift tax consequences of creating a GRIT for members of one’s family
are quite adverse under section 2702(a). It would be
helpful if the example provided that the remainder on
expiration of the term was to pass to the grantor’s niece
or nephew (a person not a member of the grantor’s
family under section 2702) or, if the niece or nephew
failed to survive, to a charity over which the grantor had
no control and to explain (perhaps by a parenthetical
sentence) that the special valuation rules of section
2702(a) would apply if the trust was to benefit a member
of the grantor’s family.
Example 5 deals with a qualified personal residence
trust, or QPRT, described in reg. section 25.2702-5(c). The
example concludes that the entire fair market value of the
QPRT’s assets is included in the grantor’s estate if the
grantor dies during the retained term. Presumably, the
reference to the QPRT’s assets and not just to the personal
residence is to demonstrate that if assets in addition to
the residence were in the trust at the grantor’s death (for
example, cash or a policy insuring the home), they too
would be included. It would be more helpful if the
example were expanded explicitly to cover those assets.
The example fails to state what portion of the trust would
be included in the grantor’s gross estate if the trust had
ceased to be a QPRT and had ‘‘converted’’ into a GRAT
before the grantor’s death as permitted in reg. section
25.2702-5(c), especially if the conversion occurred within
three years of the grantor’s death.

Conclusions
The proposed regulations, in acknowledging that section 2039 does not apply to a GRAT, GRUT, CRAT, CRUT,
or QPRT, as well as limiting inclusion in the grantor’s
gross estate based on the principles in Rev. Ruls. 76-276
and 82-105, are helpful to taxpayers and their advisers in
many ways. However, as demonstrated, the proposed
regulations in some ways seem incorrect and in other
ways seem incomplete. The proposed regulations should
be modified to address the outstanding issues described
in this article. In any case, the proposed regulations as
written would have virtually no impact on the amount
included in the grantor’s estate with respect to most
GRATs created today in which the grantor dies during
the annuity term. Most GRATs provide very high payouts for very short terms. For example, if the annuity
represents 50 percent of the initial value of the assets
contributed to the GRAT, the trust property would have
had to increase by the time of the grantor’s death by more
than five times its initial FMV to result in any part of the
trust being excluded from the grantor’s estate, even if the
section 7520 rate were 10 percent. The lower the section
7520 rate, the greater the increase would have to be to
result in any exclusion.
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correct to construe a zeroed-out GRAT as nonetheless a
transfer with a retained interest, even though the value of
the gift is equal to zero for tax purposes, but the matter
should be clarified. Even if a zeroed-out GRAT were
construed as a transfer with a retained interest, such a
GRAT might also be considered an exchange for full and
adequate consideration, falling outside the scope of section 2036.13
There is no express prohibition in the tax law on
creating a zeroed-out GRAT, but there is no authority
expressly permitting such a GRAT to be created.14 Even if
a taxpayer is denied the right to use the actuarial value of
the retained annuity stream in determining the value of
the gift made in creating the GRAT on the grounds that a
GRAT cannot be zeroed out, the amount included in the
grantor’s gross estate under section 2036 presumably
would be based on the amount of the retained annuity.
Other questions are also left unanswered. In the
preamble, the IRS may be suggesting that there may be
cases in which an annuity arrangement, other than a
GRAT or a CRAT, could be viewed as a transfer with a
retained interest falling under section 2036. In making
that suggestion, however, the preamble fails to describe
the nature of the circumstances that would make inclusion appropriate.15 Even assuming a transaction could be
viewed as a transfer with a retained interest, there
remains the possibility that the application of section
2036 could be negated on the grounds that the transfer
was made in a bona fide sale or exchange ‘‘for full and
adequate consideration in money or money’s worth.’’16
The proposed regulations fail to address that issue as
well.
Example 3 deals with a CRUT and illustrates both the
amount of the CRUT that is included in the grantor’s
gross estate as well as amount of the charitable estate tax
deduction allowed. The example ends by stating that all
the results (other than those relating to the charitable
deduction) apply to a GRUT. But apparently unlike a
CRUT described in section 664, the unitrust percentages
in a GRUT also may increase or decrease from year to
year. The regulations should discuss the effect of an
increasing or decreasing unitrust payment, as well as the
consequences of estate tax inclusion when the unitrust
payments continue for the grantor’s estate.
Example 4 deals with a so-called grantor retained
income trust, or GRIT (a trust from which the grantor has
retained the right to the income for a term of years).
Although the example seems to conclude correctly that
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Despite recent IRS and Free File Alliance assertions to
the contrary, the IRS e-file program is fundamentally
flawed. As of April 28, 2007, only 3.7 million taxpayers
have used the Free File Alliance program, a decrease of
1.8 percent from 2006, according to acting IRS Commissioner Kevin Brown.1 For taxpayers to file returns electronically, they must use a cumbersome intermediary
process that typically involves several layers of fees and
security risks. Simply stated, the current IRS e-filing
approach has created an indefensible situation that the
billion-dollar tax preparation industry has protected for
too many years. In congressional testimony this April,
National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson said:
Although I deeply believe that e-filing is best for
both taxpayers and the IRS for a host of reasons, I
resented the notion that I would have to pay
separate fees to prepare my return and to file it, so
I printed out my return and mailed it in.2
Since 2002 two of the authors of this article have
concurred with that sentiment. They have repeatedly
asserted that all taxpayers have no less than a fundamental right to directly e-file with the IRS without fees and
intermediaries.3 It is important to note that in 2006 there
were more than 130 million individual tax returns, of
which approximately 54 percent were e-filed. Of the

1
Written testimony of acting IRS Commissioner Kevin
Brown, May 9, 2007, Doc 2007-11429, 2007 TNT 91-34.
2
Written statement of National Taxpayer Advocate Nina E.
Olson, Hearing on IRS FY 2007 Budget Request before the
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, the Judiciary and Housing and Urban Development, and
Related Agencies Committee, Apr. 27, 2006, Doc 2006-8075, 2006
TNT 82-39.
3
Philip J. Harmelink and William M. VanDenburgh, ‘‘An
Assessment of the E-Filing Agreement,’’ Tax Notes, Dec. 30, 2002,
p. 1741, Doc 2003-176, 2002 TNT 251-19; VanDenburgh and
Harmelink, ‘‘The IRS’s Lack of Support for Direct, Free E-filing,’’
Tax Notes, July 10, 2006, p. 171, Doc 2006-11645, 2006 TNT 132-24.
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Congressional Calls for an IRS E-File Portal
In April the Joint Economic Committee called for the
IRS to offer free e-filing ‘‘with no income limitations and
no requisite intermediary.’’ In a news release, the JEC
said:7

4
Dustin Stamper, ‘‘IRS and Industry Defend Free File Alliance,’’ Tax Notes, May 7, 2007, p. 526, Doc 2007-10935, 2007 TNT
86-5.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Joint Economic Committee, ‘‘Free E-Filing Should Be Free,
JEC Says,’’ Economic Fact Sheet, Apr. 1, 2007.
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approximately 70 million e-filed returns, fewer than 6
percent were filed through the Free File Alliance.
Making the situation even more indefensible is that
encouraging more taxpayers to e-file without cost
through a direct IRS e-filing portal would lead to an
enormous reduction in processing costs for the IRS.
Admittedly, the IRS would have to make a significant
investment to establish a direct e-filing system. But at the
end of 2006, the IRS had available 16 out of 40 congressionally authorized critical pay positions (salaries of
more than $200,000 are available) that would go a long
way toward obtaining the talent needed to develop the
portal. The real question at this point is how the IRS’s
inherently flawed approach to e-filing has lasted for so
long.
Despite the glaring deficiencies in the current approach, the head of the Free File Alliance, Tim Hugo, on
May 2 at the Council for Electronic Revenue Communication Advancement (CERCA) meeting aggressively defended the program and attacked advocates of a direct
IRS e-filing portal. He said that he is ‘‘perplexed, confounded, dumbfounded, and ultimately annoyed’’ that
anyone would criticize the Free File Alliance and added,
‘‘I think this is really derivative of a blatantly ideological
bias against the private sector.’’4
Steven Ryan, general counsel for the Free File Alliance,
went even further. He directly attacked Olson, stating
‘‘She hasn’t liked us from day one. She’s never going to
like us. You shouldn’t have rogue agents in the federal
government.’’5
Ryan predicted that in upcoming legislation Senate
Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus, D-Mont., and
ranking minority member Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa,
would include a provision mandating that the IRS develop its own e-file portal. Ryan threatened that the Free
File Alliance would fight it and would in fact dissolve if
direct e-filing legislation were enacted.6
That outcome would be applauded by the many critics
of the program, as it would make it nearly impossible for
the IRS not to provide an efficient and effective direct
e-filing portal that could be readily and securely accessed
by all taxpayers. While the IRS would face a tremendous
challenge in developing a reliable direct e-filing portal, it
could commercially purchase the basic program. Those
inevitable implementation impediments and problems
should not prevent the IRS from meeting this longoverdue fundamental taxpayer right.

COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINTS

The IRS’s Perspective
While the IRS has at times sent mixed messages in this
area, the electronic division has repeatedly expressed
support for the Free File Alliance program. Outgoing IRS
Electronic Tax Administration Director Bert DuMars said
at the May 2007 CERCA meeting that the Free File
Alliance program has been a tremendous success with
positive customer feedback. His replacement, David R.
Williams, indicated that his plate is full: ‘‘Look at what
we’re doing today. Look at the challenges that we face.’’10
Former IRS Commissioner Mark Everson indicated support for working with the private sector when he announced Williams’s promotion to the position of director,
electronic tax administration and refundable credits:11
We’re very fortunate to have someone with David’s
expertise and background to take over this very
important program. He has the knowledge and
experience to bring together the private sector to
work with the IRS to achieve significant advances
in our shared goal of effective electronic tax administration. We see this move as a step forward for
both the program and the IRS as a whole.
The IRS’s electronic division has cited the agency’s
internal limitations as one reason the IRS has not and
should not pursue a direct e-filing portal. Incredibly, the
IRS, as of the end of 2006, could have brought in an
additional 16 highly paid employees under its existing
critical pay authority.12 The critical pay program was
passed as part of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 and allows the IRS to hire
up to 40 total employees under it. The program was
specifically passed so that the IRS could bring in needed
technical talent. The provision from the 1998 IRS reform
act says:
The Secretary of the Treasury may, for a period of 10
years after the date of enactment of this section,
establish, fix the compensation of, and appoint
individuals to, designated critical administrative,
technical, and professional positions needed to
carry out the functions of the Internal Revenue
Service, if —
(1) the positions —
(A) require expertise of an extremely high
level in an administrative, technical, or
professional field; and
(B) are critical to the Internal Revenue
Service’s successful accomplishment of an
important mission;
(2) exercise of the authority is necessary to
recruit or retain an individual exceptionally
well qualified for the position;
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• Only five million returns were filed through the Free
File Alliance in 2005 despite the program’s existence
since 2002. The 2007 tax filing season actually saw a
decline in usage of the program.
• The error rate for paper returns is 1 in 5, but for an
e-file return, it is 1 in 100, a substantial improvement.
• A paper return costs the IRS $2.65 to process as
opposed to just $0.29 for an e-file return. (In other
words, there is a staggering 89 percent per-return
processing cost saving.)
• Only 54 percent of returns were e-filed in 2006, far
short of the 80 percent rate Congress called for in
1998. In 1995 the e-filing rate was 10 percent.
• Only some taxpayers can e-file without cost, and all
taxpayers must use an intermediary to e-file. Typically, an e-filer must use a paid tax preparer or
purchase third-party tax software. Multiple layers of
fees typically apply (tax software, federal and state
e-filing fees).
• More than 40 million returns were prepared on
computers but then mailed to the IRS in 2006.
• Nearly 30 percent of all taxpayers do not qualify for
the Free File Alliance product.
• Before this tax season, Free File Alliance members
could offer dubious refund anticipation loans.
• Nearly 50 percent of the states offer free e-filing
from their Web sites.
The JEC release also notes the attraction of not having
to file through an intermediary and the hypocrisy of the
IRS to allow tax forms to be downloaded and filled out
on computers but not e-filed. The JEC further noted that
Olson has called for free e-filing for the past several
years.
Those facts make a compelling case for a free direct
IRS e-filing portal. Cost reductions of nearly 90 percent
for e-filed versus paper returns should not be dismissed
by the IRS. The preparation of 40 million returns on
computers that are not e-filed is also a huge opportunity
cost for the government. Regardless of how the IRS and
the Free File Alliance slant this program, it has been an
utter failure, with usage dropping to 3.7 million taxpayers filing returns for tax year 2006 (as of April 28, 2007).8
The fact is that taxpayers have been reluctant to have
highly sensitive private data exposed to security risks at
the intermediary level and the IRS level. The Free File
program is nowhere near universal if 30 million taxpayers cannot use the program.
Congressional sentiment for a direct and free IRS
e-filing portal is not new. Grassley said in 2006:9
It seems the tax preparation industry was holding
all the cards in the renegotiation of this program.
The industry appears to be using the Free File
program as an opportunity to bolster its revenue
through the sale of ancillary products at taxpayer
expense.
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The Free File Alliance’s Perspective
Given that tax software providers are estimated to
have made more than $1 billion in e-filing fees in 2006,16
it’s no wonder they are fiercely fighting efforts to end
their highly dubious alternative to an IRS free direct
e-filing portal.
In February 2006 Hugo wrote in a letter to Congress:17
• The Free File Alliance is composed of ‘‘a group of
software companies engaged in a voluntary publicprivate partnership with the Department of Treasury and IRS to provide free online tax preparation
and electronic filing service each year to lowerincome, disadvantaged, and underserved taxpayers.’’
• This public-private partnership does not encroach
on the private tax software industry.
• The IRS phased out its TeleFile program, which
increased the need for Free File Alliance services.
• The Free File Alliance agreement was renewed in
2005 for another four years after being extensively
reviewed by the Department of Justice.
• The Office of Management and Budget has called
the program ‘‘the most successful and effective
electronic government initiative.’’
• The Free File Alliance asserts that 94 million Americans qualify for its services.
The letter raises some interesting issues. It states that
the commercial tax software industry competes by offering ‘‘different and varied service offers.’’ If that’s the case,
the tax software industry is disingenuous in asserting
that free direct IRS e-filing is a threat to their industry. In
other words, they should compete based on a better
product or a higher level of service, not by trying to limit
the ability of the IRS to meet basic taxpayer needs. The
IRS should offer simple, basic, direct e-filing tax software,
while the tax software industry should compete by
offering a superior product with multiple added features.
All taxpayers, regardless of their income levels, should be
able to e-file directly with the IRS without cost (the Free
File Alliance program in 2006 was restricted to taxpayers
with under $52,000 in income).18 Unfortunately, lowincome users of the IRS TeleFile phone system apparently
found the Free File Alliance program a poor alternative
and many did not switch to it.19
Taxpayer Advocate Perspective
In an April 2007 written statement to Congress, Olson
said the IRS should provide a free and direct IRS e-filing
portal to taxpayers.20 Important benefits of e-filing for
taxpayers are that IRS transcription errors are eliminated,
returns can be prescreened for common errors, and the
refund process is accelerated. Important IRS benefits of
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(3) the number of such positions does not
exceed 40 at any one time;
(4) designation of such positions are approved by the Secretary of the Treasury; [and]
(5) the terms of such appointments are limited
to no more than 4 years.
In others words, despite IRS claims to the contrary, it
could immediately bring in a large group of highly paid
professionals with the mandate to bring the IRS completely and fully into the electronic age. While the critical
pay authority expires in July 2008, Congress should
extend it with the requirement that the IRS use this
program to get the needed e-filing personnel.
DuMars should be well aware of the IRS’s critical pay
authority because that’s where his salary comes from. His
base salary in 2006 was $160,350 with a bonus potential of
$20,000. Critical pay positions in 2006 could pay a
maximum salary of $208,100. Typically, IRS employees
are paid according to the government’s general service
scale, which in 2006 had a maximum salary of $118,957.
The senior executive service pay scale maxes out at
$165,200.13
Interestingly, in a December 2004 Journal of Accountancy article, DuMars urged CPAs to convert to electronic
filing because of its many advantages over paper filing.
Under ‘‘business benefits’’ he wrote:14
Purchasing e-file software, converting clients and
employers to electronic filing and implementing
new business practices all require an initial financial and time commitment. However, CPAs who
use IRS e-file for business or individual returns say
the up-front investment is quickly recouped because the program helps them work more efficiently.
Later in the article, DuMars provided a list of ‘‘benefits
of electronic filing — speed, accuracy, cost-effectiveness,
and improved productivity.’’15 Would not those same
benefits and more accrue to the IRS if it had its own free
direct e-filing portal? While implementation would no
doubt be problematic, the long-term payoffs would be
dramatic and the advantages would occur annually.
DuMars’s repeated defense of the inherently flawed
Free File Alliance approach to free e-filing is weak. With
fewer than 5 million out of more than 130 million
individual returns using the Free File Alliance program,
it can be argued that the program is a failure. That the IRS
has unfilled senior, high-level positions that it has authority to fill is just making a bad situation worse.
If the IRS could achieve an 80 percent e-filing rate, the
reduction in processing costs alone would be staggering,
given the nearly 90 percent cost savings to the IRS
through the use of electronic versus paper returns. The
failure of the IRS to pursue a direct e-filing portal is
nothing less than complete bureaucratic irresponsibility
or ineptitude.
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Olson said the IRS should provide ‘‘a basic, fill-in
template on its website’’ and added that claims this
would compete improperly against the private sector are
‘‘nonsense.’’ Further, she indicated that for 80 years the
IRS has always made forms and instructions ‘‘universally
available’’ without fees and that an analogy can be made
between the IRS requiring a taxpayer to pay to e-file and
requiring a taxpayer to pay for tax forms.
Olson also said that in preparing her own 2006 tax
return, she used a $19.95 tax preparation software package. She would have had to spend an additional $14.95 to
e-file. It is a sad statement when the national taxpayer
advocate has a compelling and legitimate reason not to
e-file. Obviously, she does not qualify for the Free File
Alliance program, as her government salary in 2006 was
$162,100 with a bonus potential of $30,500 (both Olson
and DuMars are critical pay executives).21 She called on
Congress to ‘‘reiterate its commitment’’ to e-filing that it
expressed in the 1998 IRS reform act. The IRS Oversight
Board has recommended this as well.22
Olson recognized the inherent conflict in the Free File
Alliance offering universally available free services (their
business would materially suffer if all eligible taxpayers
used the IRS Free File Alliance program). She noted that
the IRS would likely not be able to develop the needed
tax software directly but would likely contract with the
private sector to purchase it. She closed her section on
e-filing by stating:

There is no reason why taxpayers should be required to pay transaction fees in order to file their
returns electronically. A free template and direct
filing portal would go a long way toward addressing this problem and would result in a greater
number of taxpayers filing their returns electronically. Both taxpayers and the government would
stand to benefit.

Conclusion
In direct contrast with the Free File Alliance’s portrayal of the national taxpayer advocate as a ‘‘rogue
agent,’’23 we applaud her position on e-filing. The IRS
electronic division’s claims that the Free File Alliance
agreement is in the best interest of taxpayers is clearly
untenable. The Free File Alliance program protects the
billion-dollar vested interest of the tax software providers
and a few others. We strongly urge the IRS to fill its 16
unused critical pay positions with appropriate e-filing
technical personnel, which would go a long way in
providing the resources needed to develop a free direct
IRS e-filing portal and help achieve Congress’s expressed
goal of an 80 percent e-filing rate by 2007.
Unfortunately, that will be highly unlikely barring a
mandate for a radically new approach by the new IRS
commissioner. The development of a direct IRS e-filing
portal should be one of his top priorities — if not the top
priority. Should he choose to do so, he could easily make
the case that free direct e-filing for all American taxpayers
is long overdue and critical to the IRS meeting its
strategic goals of improving taxpayer service and modernizing its system through its people, processes, and
technology.24
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e-filing are that resources can be shifted from processing
paper returns, the IRS can capture data electronically, and
the review and processing of returns is accelerated.

